Selon une analyse très répandue aujourd'hui, la société contemporaine serait caractérisée par une vaste autonomie des acteurs ; pourtant, ce n'est pas parce que l'hétéronomie autoritaire a régressé au cours des dernières décennies que toute forme d'hétéronomie a disparu, ni que l'autonomie s'étend automatiquement à toute la société. Les domaines dans lesquels le terme « autonomie » est actuellement d'usage courant sont multiples et les acceptions scientifiques du concept fort diverses ; est-ce à dire qu'un même mot est employé pour (...) désigner des faits irréductibles entre eux ou bien n'est-il de véritable autonomie que complexe, tant individuelle que collective ? En tout cas, l'autonomie est moins, aujourd'hui, une réalité, qu'un projet de société, à la fois exigeant, limité et novateur. (shrink)

Dans le contexte de renaissance régionale qui caractérise l'Europe d'aujourd'hui, la Bretagne se distingue par un fort contraste entre la vivacité de son dynamisme culturel et la déficience de son expression politique. Ceci peut s'expliquer par le fait que la singularité bretonne, longtemps dépréciée et refoulée, ne fait l'objet que d'une réévaluation progressive : si ses connotations négatives s'estompent dans le domaine culturel, il n'en est pas encore de même sur le plan politique, où elle demeure taboue face à un (...) État central qui conserve un caractère en partie sacré. Divers indices, cependant, laissent penser qu'il n'est pas exclu que l'identité prenne bientôt, en Bretagne comme ailleurs, une dimension politique dont les modalités sont envisagées ici sous la forme de trois scénarios. (shrink)

On présente trois projets de théories des machines: la « mécanologie » de l’architecte Jacques Lafitte (1932), inspirée de l’évolution biologique; l’ «Analyse mécanique» de Louis Couffignal, spécialiste des machines à calculer (1938), qui préfigure l’analyse fonctionnelle; et la théorie algébrique des machines du mathématicien Jacques Riguet (début des années 1950). À cette période, les trois hommes sont membres du Cercle d’études cybernétiques. On s’intéresse au dialogue des projets, aux axes d’unification et de divergence, aux styles, aux stratégies et postulats (...) de ces trois candidats à la généralisation convergeant vers la référence constituée par la cybernétique. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show the relevance of the sociology of market agencements for studying the creation of alternative agri-food networks. The authors start with their finding that most research into alternative agri-food networks takes a strictly informative, cursory look at the conditions under which these networks are gradually created. They then explain how the sociology of market agencements analyzes the construction of innovative markets and how it can be used in agri-food studies. The relevance of this (...) theoretical frame is shown based on an experiment aimed at creating a local trade scheme between manure from livestock farms and alfalfa grown by grain farmers. By using the concepts of the sociology of market agencements, the authors reveal the operations that are required to create an alternative agri-food network and underscore the difficulties that attend each one of these operations. This enables them to see the phenomena of lock-ins and sociotechnical transition in a new light. (shrink)

On présente trois projets de théories des machines: la « mécanologie » de l’architecte Jacques Lafitte (1932), inspirée de l’évolution biologique; l’ «Analyse mécanique» de Louis Couffignal, spécialiste des machines à calculer (1938), qui préfigure l’analyse fonctionnelle; et la théorie algébrique des machines du mathématicien Jacques Riguet (début des années 1950). À cette période, les trois hommes sont membres du Cercle d’études cybernétiques. On s’intéresse au dialogue des projets, aux axes d’unification et de divergence, aux styles, aux stratégies et postulats (...) de ces trois candidats à la généralisation convergeant vers la référence constituée par la cybernétique. (shrink)

The paper deals with the introduction of nanotechnology in biochips. Based on interviews and theoretical reflections, it explores blind spots left by technology assessment and ethical investigations. These have focused on possible consequences of increased diffusability of a diagnostic device, neglecting both the context of research as well as increased accuracy, despite it being a more essential feature of nanobiochip projects. Also, rather than one of many parallel aspects in innovation processes, ethics is considered here as a ubiquitous system of (...) choices between sometimes antagonistic values. Thus, the paper investigates what is at stake when accuracy is balanced with other practical values in different contexts. Dramatic nanotechnological increase of accuracy in biochips can raise ethical issues, since it is at odds with other values such as diffusability and reliability. But those issues will not be as revolutionary as is often claimed: neither in diagnostics, because accuracy of measurements is not accuracy of diagnostics; nor in research, because a boost in measurement accuracy is not sufficient to overcome significance-chasing malpractices. The conclusion extends to methodological recommendations. (shrink)

Cet article est l’occasion de rappeler que le numérique, outil de communication aux avantages économiques indéniables, est également un facteur de risques pour les libertés individuelles. Devenu incontournable, le développement du numérique exige une recherche perpétuelle d’équilibre entre attraits économiques et préservation des libertés individuelles. Le lecteur est invité à suivre le point de vue d’un avocat exerçant en droit du numérique, observateur de l’oscillation entre progression des outils numériques enrichis par l’intelligence artificielle et respect des principes qui gouvernent toute (...) société démocratique. (shrink)

Transition education is a major challenge to be taken up. It is not simply a question of teaching a person a specific area of ​​knowledge – in this case ecological and societal questions – but rather recognizing that individuals are built by their reflections, with their feelings and according to their experiences. None of these dimensions should be left aside if we want to promote the full development of each individual. In this sense it seems important to us to explain (...) the values ​​that underlie our educational offer and the goals pursued by transition education, as well as its founding roots. This chapter thus starts by presenting the pillars for head-heart-body learning, namely a pedagogy that is relational and transformational, integrative and holistic, inter- and transdisciplinary, rooted and open. Secondly, we structure the pedagogy of the transition around six major areas of questioning, corresponding to the six gates of the FORTES approach. Eventually, drawing on the competency-based approach we present the six main transversal skills to be acquired. (shrink)

In this chapter we identify seven transversal principles which guide our pedagogical approach, and which are today widely shared by teachers. These principles also seem to us to be consistent with research in neuroscience, in particular that of Stanislas “Dehaene, Stanislas. Apprendre! les talents du cerveau, le défi des machines. Odile Jacob, Paris, (2018)” and his four pillars of learning – attention, active engagement, error and surprise signals and the consolidation of acquired knowledge – or those of Antonio “Damasio, Antonio (...) R. L’erreur de Descartes: la raison des émotions. Odile Jacob, Paris, (1995)” on the fundamental role of emotions in supporting learning. The principles advocated are: solicitation of curiosity and commitment; learning through sensitive experiences; connection of knowledge, emotions and values; reappropriation of assessment methods; multifaceted posture of the teacher; politicization of education; self-awareness and striving for common good.The principles highlighted in this section represent the major levers to be operated in order to provide students with truly transformative learning. Tools and examples of real-life implementation of these principles will be detailed in the second part of this book. (shrink)

Implementing a head-heart-body pedagogy in higher education institutions needs the mobilization of all the actors currently involved in education, to identify those who are absent today and surpass the logic that feeds on silo effects in order to support actors towards sustainable educational actions. By transforming campuses and courses, the university can thus become a learning organization where everything is about learning not only for students, but also for all actors in the university community. This chapter mentions first students, who (...) are the direct beneficiaries of education as well as the future actors of the transition. Secondly, it calls upon teacher-researchers to incarnate the multifaceted role of mentors, which far beyond the transmission of knowledge involves accompanying the students in a holistic transformation. Third, it turns towards pedagogical support services, whose diverse disciplines and skills are essential to develop the pedagogical methods required for transition education. Finally, the chapter underlies the role of public authorities to systematize good practices, to allow bottom-up incentives to grow, to put in place the necessary conditions and resources as well as to engage the whole of society. (shrink)

To meet the ecological challenge, higher education must face many challenges: the educational offer, which is currently limited in many aspects, must evolve by renewing its methods while adapting its content. An “ecological awakening” is necessary to stimulate student awareness and action. This awakening is already present in some establishments which have transformed their educational model as well as their training in order to integrate and incarnate a more holistic vision of the world. These examples are all sources of inspiration (...) that can serve as a basis for reflection to modify university courses in depth. This chapter outlines first the shortcomings of the current educational model – in terms of content and methods – drawing on the authors’ insights, mostly from France. Then, the chapter turns towards recent evolutions, be it structural or transient, as well as incentives at various levels that could contribute to a transition of higher education. (shrink)

This introduction draws on Charles Dickens’ analysis of schooling in England during the industrial revolution to highlight the connection bethween the Anthropocene epoch we currently live in and education. While we outline points for critique, we are far from making a simple judgment. In reaction, we present the Great Transition Handbook with its systemic approach based on six gates, and we call on pedagogy to be more holistic in order to integrate all dimensions of humanity. We also clarify our understanding (...) of the Great Transition, as a process interweaving both social and ecological concerns. (shrink)

Some universities have set up courses relating to the systemic integration of ecological and social issues into their curricula. We are presenting two types of initiatives here: first, those that come directly from universities or higher education institutions, such as the University of Lausanne; secondly, those which emanate from small organizations created to constitute a higher education transition laboratory, linked to a university institution, as is the case of Schumacher College (United Kingdom) linked to the University of Plymouth or the (...) Sustainability Institute (South Africa) attached to Stellenbosch University. (shrink)

On défend ici l’hypothèse selon laquelle les relations d’idées humiennes ont pu servir de matrice à la constitution d’un a priori phénoménologique, en un sens particulier : conçues d’abord comme relations internes, elles ont dû être partiellement arrachées à un modèle représentationnel hérité de Brentano et insérées dans un dispositif ontologique, s’exprimant alors selon une modalité qui est celle du rapport d’essence.

Teachers may be skeptical about the possibility of implementing transition pedagogy, as outlined in the first part of this book, given the current context of higher education. Here we synthetize therefore the pedagogical tools that we have identified in the courses offered by establishments that have practiced a transition pedagogy for a long time, as well as those being used at the Campus de la Transition since 2018. We also draw on interviews with experts and practitioners, psychologists, teachers and explorers (...) of new practices. (Interviews with Chrysoline Brabant – clinical psychologist and certified coach, Mark Swilling – founder of the Sustainability Institute, Jacques Tardif – professor at the University of Sherbrooke and specialist in university pedagogy, Laurent Van Ditzhuyzen – co-founder of the Université du Nous, Thibault Griessinger – PhD in cognitive sciences and founder of Acte Lab, Hubert Trapet and Valérie Fayard – Emmaüs France CEO and vice-chair). The chapter starts with the lightest tools, which can be set up quite easily in a classroom, moving towards the most ambitious, and resulting in a coherent picture of the higher establishment in service of the Great Transition teachings. (shrink)

This book functions as a practical guide to support teachers and higher education institutions in the construction of their courses and programmes in light of the Anthropocene. It is divided into two complementary parts. The first part lays the theoretical foundations of what is a transition pedagogy and provides a pedagogical framework. It offers practical tools and didactic levers to be used by teachers and institutions to build a truly transformative pedagogy for students, with reference to universities already experimenting such (...) alternative methods. The second part presents an analysis of the pedagogical tools and levers experienced in worldwide institutions, by teachers, as well as philosophers and experts of pedagogy. The authors of this book advocate for an embodied pedagogy which not only gives students access to content but also to ways of thinking and acting in all conscience. A pedagogy of the Anthropocene epoch therefore encourages the mobilization of reason, emotions and senses as well as systemic reflection in the questioning of our lifestyles and the development of transversal skills. Based on internationally recognized research and practical experiences of institutions and teachers all over the western world, this book gathers the knowledge and experience of professors and researchers, coming from a wide variety of disciplines and cultural context. Their reflections have led them to develop a “head-heart-body approach” and a “6 Gates questioning method” to remodel pedagogy. This book is of interest to those working in the education sector. (shrink)

L’Afrique a participé jusqu’a présent, souvent à titre de laboratoire, au développement de la science occidentale. Les défis rencontrés par la théorie critique aujourd’hui sont l’instrumentalisation de la théorie par les gouvernements, la prolifération de pratiques critiques diverses, notamment écologique, et surtout l’émergence d’un capitalisme de l’image et de l’affect. C’est en relation avec la Chine que l’Afrique peut apporter de nouvelles réponses et relever ces défis.

Il peut sembler de mauvaise méthode et même de mauvais augure pour la recherche en général de voir un article de plus limiter son propos à la justification du choix, heureux ou malheureux, de son titre. Au risque de décevoir et de perdre les premiers lecteurs, ce pourrait bien être le cas ici : sont mis en relation et même dans une relation privilégiée, celle de types-idéaux distincts de la réalité empirique fluctuante, les concepts de passivité et d?inconscient (en tous (...) les cas de raisonnement inconscient, soit une place très particulière accordée à l?inconscient, comme on va le voir). Or, s?il est sûr que ces concepts ne se recouvrent pas, il n?est pas du tout certain qu?ils se recoupent même a priori. Les lignes qui suivent seront donc consacrées à la jonction possible d?un concept de passivité et d?un concept d?inconscient, jonction qui trouve peut-être sa meilleure occasion dans la psychophysiologie de Wilhelm Wundt. Mais pour qui s?est penché un peu sur ces questions, l?entreprise semble plutôt désespérée. Le premier obstacle, de taille, est le suivant : si l?on entend par passivi­té l?ensemble des activités pré-réflexives de la conscience, il se pourrait fort que la catégorie de la passivité telle qu?elle est élaborée en site empiriste au xix e siècle ne recoupe a priori aucun concept d?inconscient, pour la simple raison qu?elle apparaîtrait dans le cadre de psychologies génétiques qui. (shrink)

La phénoménologie réaliste de Reinach ne se limite pas à une doctrine originale des états de choses et des relations d'essences. Elle procède également, en contrepoint, à une analyse de la relation de causalité dont la phénoménologie transcendantale ne fournit aucun équivalent. Cette analyse, qui met en avant la notion de nécessité matérielle, se déploie à partir d'une relecture critique de Hume, le plus grand représentant moderne de la crise de la causalité. Reinach's realistic phenomenology doesn't limit itself to being (...) an original theory of states of affair and relations of essences. On the counterpart, it is leading an analysis of the relation of causality, of which transcendantal phenomenology doesn't provide any comparable instance. This analysis highlights the notion of material necessity, which is producted upon a critical reading of Humes Treatise, modernity's biggest representant of causality crisis. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Cabanis a eu énormément de mal à sortir d’une place qui lui était prescrite au moment même de son inscription dans le champ philosophique et scientifique allemand. Cette place, c’est celle de continuateur audacieux, informé, d’un projet lui-même daté : le projet d’une anthropologie physiologique, dont on estimait que les limites en avaient d’emblée été fixées par Kant et qu’en conséquence il n’était pas voué à un grand avenir. Pendant un demi-siècle environ, l’œuvre philosophique de Cabanis, limitée ici (...) aux fameux mémoires sur les Rapports du physique et du moral chez l’homme, a trouvé dans l’anthropologie physiologique, critiquée par Kant, son pré carré et les conditions de sa relative extinction. C’est une seconde réception, sans doute plus souterraine, plus muette aussi sur l’influence réelle que Cabanis a pu exercer, qui lui a permis de ressurgir au début des années 1860, sous une autre forme ou en une autre place : celle de père de la psychophysiologie, une place en apparence identifiable ou superposable à la précédente mais bien distincte. C’est sur cette seconde position, plus favorable à Cabanis, qu’on conclut ces analyses. (shrink)

On veut établir ici comment la relecture de Hume par l'école de Brentano, associée au projet d'une généalogie critique des théories des relations, conduit les philosophes autrichiens à élaborer une alternative décisive pour l'empirisme contemporain: l'opposition entre une psychologie fortement inspirée de Descartes et de Locke, et qui tend vers des positions typiquement conceptualistes, celle que défend Meinong, et un intuitionnisme enrichi de la référence aux « qualités de formes », dont Ehrenfels est l'initiateur. Our purpose is here to show (...) how the reading of Hume by Brentano's school, within a critical genealogy of the theory of relations, has led Austrian philosophers to set up a conclusive alternative for today's empiricism: on the one hand, a psychology deeply influenced by Descartes and Locke, and which verges on typically conceptualist positions (and which is supported by Meinong), and on the other and, an intuitionnism, strengthened by references to « gestaltqualities », initiated by Ehrenfels. (shrink)

Vers la fin du XVIIe siècle, les dictionnaires expriment bien l’embarras général devant le terme « sensation ». Ainsi Furetière, en 1690, définit la sensation comme « Action des sens, ou plutôt de l’âme, qui est émue par les impressions qu’ils ont souffertes. La plus grande difficulté de la Philosophie, poursuit-il, est d’expliquer la sensation, comment les objets corporels peuvent agir sur l’âme qui est spirituelle. » Quatre ans plus tard, le dictionnaire de l’Académie française exprime lui ..

Chapitre 1. Sport et domination capitaliste (Patrick Vassort) -- Chapitre 2. Sport, anthropofacture et conformisme généralisé (Clément Hamel) -- Chapitre 3. Le sport contre les femmes (Ronan David) -- Chapitre 4. Le sport ou la fin de l'espace vécu (Simon Maillard) -- Chapitre 5. Propagande sportive et colonisation du quotidien (Fabien Lebrun) -- Chapitre 6. Le sport: une entreprise d'uniformisation et de déculturation. L'exemple des JO de Pékin (Bernard Allain) -- Chapitre 7. Le sport contre la culture et l'éducation (...) (Camille Dal et Nicolas Oblin). (shrink)

"To be a philosopher and to be a feminist are one and the same thing. A feminist is a woman who does not allow anyone to think in her place."-from _Hipparchia's Choice_ A work of rare insight and irreverence, _Hipparchia's Choice_ boldly recasts the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the post-Derrideans as one of masculine texts and male problems. The position of women, therefore, is less the result of a hypothetical "femininity" and more the fault of exclusion by (...) men. Nevertheless, women have been and continue to be drawn to "the exercise of thought." So how does a female philosopher become a conceptually adventurous woman? Focusing on the work of Sartre and Beauvoir (specifically, his sexism and her relation to it), Michèle Le Doeuff shows how women philosophers can reclaim a place for feminist concerns. Is _The Second Sex_ a work of philosophy, and, if so, what can it teach us about the relation of philosophy to experience? Now with a new epilogue, _Hipparchia's Choice_ points the way toward a discipline that is accountable to history, feminism, and society. (shrink)

According to a historical claim oft-repeated by contemporary epistemologists, the ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge prevailed in Western philosophy prior to the publication in 1963 of Edmund’s Gettier’s famous three-page article ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. On this conception, knowledge consists of justified true belief. In this article, I critically consider evidence for and against this historical claim, and conclude with a puzzle concerning its widespread acceptance.

Over the last decade, businesses, policymakers, and researchers alike have advocated the need for value creation through inter-organizational collaboration. Researchers have widely argued that organizations that are engaged in collaborative processes create value. Because researchers have tended to focus on the identification of organizational motivations and on key success factors for collaboration, however, both the nature and processes of value creation in inter-organizational collaboration have yet to be examined. A recent theory by Austin and Seitanidi :726–758, 2012a; Nonprofit Volunt Sect (...) Q 41:929–968, 2012b) has proposed an analytical framework for analyzing value creation in inter-organizational collaboration, based on four types of value. The purpose of this current study is to empirically test this framework, and to provide key pointers for analyzing the nature of value, particularly in relation to learning. Our detailed empirical research is based on a 6-year retrospective case study of an inter-organizational partnership within an international development project for local economic development in Guatemala. The study’s contributions are twofold. First, it provides evidence of the critical path of the creation of diverse types of values in a collaborative process; second, it links the different types of value creation with the types of learning that occur in an inter-organizational process. (shrink)

Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...) its deployment in an ingenious new argument advanced by Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (2009) which, if sound, establishes that there is a kind of knowledge that amounts to nothing more than true belief. I rebut their argument and in doing so delineate some important epistemological lessons brought to light by the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. (shrink)

Does chemistry reduce to physics? If this means ‘Can we derive the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics?’, recent discussions suggest that the answer is ‘no’. But sup posing that kind of reduction—‘epistemological reduction’—to be impossible, the thesis of ontological reduction may still be true: that chemical properties are determined by more fundamental properties. However, even this thesis is threatened by some objections to the physicalist programme in the philosophy of mind, objections that generalize to the chemical case. (...) Two objections are discussed: that physicalism is vacuous, and that nothing grounds the asymmetry of dependence which reductionism requires. Although it might seem rather surprising that the philosophy of chemistry is affected by shock waves from debates in the philosophy of mind, these objections show that there is an argumentative gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical connection linking chemical properties with properties at the sub-atomic level, and, on the other, the philosophical thesis of ontological reduction. The aim of this paper is to identify the missing premises (among them a theory of physical possibility) that would bridge this gap. Introduction: missing elements and the mystery of discreteness The refutation of physicalism A combinatorial theory of physical possibilia Combinatorialism and the Bohr model Objections The missing premises and a disanalogy with mind. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

In previous analyses of the influence of language on cognition, speech has been the main channel examined. In studies conducted among Yucatec Mayas, efforts to determine the preferred frame of reference in use in this community have failed to reach an agreement (Bohnemeyer & Stolz, 2006; Levinson, 2003 vs. Le Guen, 2006, 2009). This paper argues for a multimodal analysis of language that encompasses gesture as well as speech, and shows that the preferred frame of reference in Yucatec Maya is (...) only detectable through the analysis of co-speech gesture and not through speech alone. A series of experiments compares knowledge of the semantics of spatial terms, performance on nonlinguistic tasks and gestures produced by men and women. The results show a striking gender difference in the knowledge of the semantics of spatial terms, but an equal preference for a geocentric frame of reference in nonverbal tasks. In a localization task, participants used a variety of strategies in their speech, but they all exhibited a systematic preference for a geocentric frame of reference in their gestures. (shrink)

What is agnosticism? Is it a belief, or just the absence of belief? What is the 'agnostic' principle? Robin Le Poidevin takes a philosophical approach to the issue of agnosticism, challenging some of the common assumptions, arguing in favour of the agnostic attitude, and considering its place in society and education.

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that (...) the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge ; and epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves? (shrink)

One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance and supports the Standard View of Ignorance.

La vieille question du statut ontologique du présent refait aujourd’hui surface au travers du débat qui oppose présentisme et éternisme. Les présentistes défendent la thèse selon laquelle seul ce qui est présent existe. Les éternistes soutiennent quant à eux que le présent ne jouit d’aucun privilège ontologique, les choses passées et futures existant tout autant que les choses présentes. Dans cet article nous ne chercherons pas à départager les protagonistes mais à écarter les théories dites « hybrides » qui prétendent (...) bénéficier des avantages de chacune des positions sans hériter de leurs inconvénients. Nous commencerons par retracer le débat entre présentisme et éternisme (section 1), puis nous présenterons les motivations des défenseurs des théories hybrides (section 2). Enfin, dans notre dernière section, nous avancerons un argument qui, s’il est juste, montre que les théories hybrides ne sont pas cohérentes. (shrink)

According to the Ignorance Factivity Thesis, for every proposition p, one is ignorant of p only if p is a truth. By contrast, according to the Ignorance Non-Factivity Thesis, it is false that, for every proposition p, one is ignorant of p only if p is a truth. I argue that, on balance, the case for the latter thesis is stronger than the case for the former.

This paper explores and articulates an alternative to the two main approaches that have come to predominate in contemporary philosophical discussionsof skepticism. These we may call the ‘Foil Approach’ and the ‘Bypass Approach’ respectively. On the Foil Approach, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticism’s value, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge (...) and justified belief. On the Bypass Approach, skepticism is bypassed as a central concern of epistemology. In this paper, I articulate an alternative to both these approaches, one that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not. I call it the ‘Health Approach’ to skepticism. (shrink)

La pertinence de la métaphysique analytique a fait l'objet de critiques : Ladyman et Ross, par exemple, ont suggéré d'abandonner ce domaine. French et McKenzie ont défendu la métaphysique analytique en affirmant qu'elle développe des outils qui pourraient s'avérer utiles pour la philosophie de la physique. Dans cet article, nous montrons dans un premier temps que cette défense heuristique de la métaphysique peut être étendue au domaine scientifique de l'ontologie appliquée, qui utilise des théories et outils issus de la métaphysique (...) analytique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous développons le parallèle que font French et McKenzie entre les mathématiques et la métaphysique pour montrer que l'ensemble du domaine de la métaphysique analytique, étant donné son utilité non seulement pour la philosophie mais également pour la science, devrait continuer à exister en tant que domaine largement autonome. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe sets out in a recent paper1 to refute McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time, by exposing an ‘indexical fallacy’ in his disproof of the existence of tensed (i. e., A-series) facts.2 Lowe then develops an original account of what makes time the dimension of change, based on his own account of tensed facts. But in our opinion he fails on both counts: (1) he fails to refute McTaggart's perfectly sound disproof of tensed facts, which shows that (...) time can be real only if (Lowe and McTaggart not withstanding) it needs no tensed facts, and (2) he fails to explain the temporal character of change, since his account of it has an exact spatial analogue. In what follows we argue these two points in turn. (shrink)